With KEYPLUG, China’s RedGolf Spies On, Steals From Wide Field of Targets
RedGolf remains highly active within a wide range of geographies and is known to target aviation, automotive, education, government, media, information technology, and religious organizations. Organizations of strategic interest to the Chinese government and security services — are likely at increased risk of targeting. This report examines recent activity of the group, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and offers mitigation strategies for organizations.
According to public reporting, RedGolf used a Linux version of the custom modular backdoor KEYPLUG to target US state government entities during 2021 and 2022. Insikt Group has identified a wider cluster of KEYPLUG samples and operational infrastructure used by RedGolf from at least 2021 to 2023. We actively track this malicious infrastructure using the term GhostWolf. Alongside KEYPLUG, we also identified RedGolf using Cobalt Strike, PlugX, and Dynamic DNS (DDNS) domains, all of which are commonly used amongst many Chinese state-sponsored threat groups. Insikt Group identified multiple infrastructure overlaps between publicly reported APT41/BARIUM campaigns across the identified GhostWolf infrastructure cluster.
RedGolf will continue to target victims with KEYPLUG malware and its derivatives using command and control infrastructure spanning a variety of hosting providers. The group has previously utilized a mixture of both traditionally registered domains and DDNS domains, often featuring a technology theme. We believe this TTP will remain relatively unchanged with the exception of a decrease in DDNS use.
The employment of both Cobalt Strike and PlugX to target victim machines by Chinese state-sponsored threat activity groups, such as RedGolf, is highly likely to continue given the feature set provided by these tools, their ready availability, and the ability to obfuscate responsibility due to the number of other threat actors using these techniques.
Recorded Future proactively detects both Cobalt Strike and PlugX servers. We recommend incorporating this feed into blocking lists and/or alerting to prevent infections.
To read the entire analysis with endnotes, click here to download the report as a PDF.